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never know : it vanished into the Unknowable ReaHty
behind all phenomena, etc., etc.," is wholly without
warrant in the language of Mr. Fiske and is a manifest
distortion of his thought. It was the mental com-
mentary, doubtless, of Mr. Wakeman as he listened
to the lecture,—the product of his own vivid imagina-
tion and strong positivistic bias ; but it has not the
most remote warrant in the terms used by the lecturer.
The comments of Dr. Carus in so far as they are based
upon Mr. Wakeman's unauthorised interjection into
the argument of Mr. Fiske are of course irrelevant,
save as protests against the ghostly philosophical
creation of Mr. Wakeman's vivid imagination. As a
"spook" raiser Mr. Wakeman has few or no equals.
The phrase "with which it is concentric," which we
have italicised, indicates clearly that Mr. Fiske's rhe-
torical figure implied a definite and constant relation-
ship between the psychic and physical processes,
though not one of quantitative equivalence.
As to the nature of the relations between the psychic
states and the corresponding physical processes, there-
fore, there does not thus far appear to be any substan-
tial difference between the Spencerian agnostic and
Dr. Carus. Speaking of feeling and motion elsewhere.
Dr. Carus declares : "The abstract conceptions form
two parallel systems." ("Fundamental Problems,"
p. 338.) He again asserts: "All our concepts, mat-
ter and mind included, are only symbols to represent
certain features abstracted from the fact of experience.
Ota- abstract concepts are not realities, but ideas ; mere
noumena, things of thought, invented for the sole pur-
pose of comprehension To declare that force
and feeling, and consciousness and thought are ma-
terial does not prove the boldness of free-thought, it
betrays an immature mind Matter, force, mind,
spirit, form, feeling, are mere abstractions. To look
upon any of these .... as something else than terms
or symbols, to look upon them as ' omneities ' or all-
comprehension realities, is a self-mystification."
All this, as we understand it, admirably expresses
the idea of Mr. Spencer. The essentially disparate
conceptions of material processes and psychical states,
and the essentially symbolical character of each, are
familiar thoughts to the student of the synthetic phi-
losophy.
We are brought back, then, to the consideration of
the nature of the Reality of which these processes and
states are disparate mental symbols. That there is
such a Reality is agreed both by the objective monist
and the philosophical agnostic. Completing a sen-
tence already quoted in part, Dr. Carus says: "The
abstract conceptions form two parallel systems, but the
real thing can be represented as parallel only in the sense
that it is parallel to itself." And he further declares,
in terms which no Spencerian will contravene : "We
must never forget that all our scientific inquiries deal
with certain sides of reality only." ("Fundamental
Problems," p. 348.) It therefore appears that all men-
tal and physical processes are disparate abstractions
or symbolical interpretations in terms of conscious-
ness of certain processes which constitute or apper-
tain to a Reality the nature of which is not otherwise
revealed to us. For if otherwise revealed, how other-
wise? Save material processes and thought pro-
cesses what can possibly constitute the object of our
conscious apprehension and investigation ? Does any
conceivable synthesis or commingling of these two
sj'mbolical and disparate processes constitute the whole
of Reality? Manifestl}', not. Confessedly not, in a
scientific sense; for Dr. Carus admits that "all our
scientific inquiries deal with certain sides of reality
only." Logically not: for no synthesis of disparate
symbols can possibly constitute a complete knowledge
of unified Being. Actually not : for it is impossible
to form a concept of such a synthetised symbol in
thought.
We have looked in vain through the accessible
writings of Dr. Carus for any adequate definition or
description of the innermost nature of the monistic
Reality of which mental and physical processes are,
by his own explicit admission, disparate and symbol-
ical representations in consciousness. We find, in-
deed, such formal definitions as "Reality is the sum
total of all the facts that are, or can become, objects
of experience" ("Fundamental Problems," p. 254),
but this is a definition which does not define ; it amounts
to no more than saying "Reality is everything," and
gives us no information as to its intrinsic nature. It
even helps to befog the subject rather than to en-
lighten it ; for if mental and material processes are not
"realities,"* as he assures us, how can "realities "be-
come objects of experience at all ? Our experience is
transformed in consciousness to a knowledge of these
symbolical processes ; and such knowledge would
therefore appear to be the whole subject-matter of our
conscious experience.
The philosophical agnostic does not seek for any
such definition of the essential nature of Reality. He
recognises and confesses the futility of such search.
The same psychological principle which compels the
confession that mind and matter are mental abstrac-
tions or disparate thought symbols of this Reality,
proves to him that it can only be known indirectly, by
and through the interpretation of these symbols. What
it is in its innermost constitution can never be revealed
to a finite being. Such a being can only know this
Reality symbolically, as it is related to his own limited
* [This is a misstatement of my position, which for brevity's sake may be
corrected at once. Mental as well as material processes, in my opinion, are
realities. They are no realities if considered by themselves as abstract ideas-
—Editor,]
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psj'chical faculties. This s3'mbolism constitutes the
very nature o£ our knowledge. And the recognition
of this fact is the irrefragable foundation of philosoph-
ical agnosticism.
The philosophical agnostic may consistently deny,
with Dr. Cams, that "legitimate problems exist that
are insolvable"; but the question of the intimate na-
ture and constitution of Reality is not, he claims, a
legitimate problem for the human intellect, since its
data are wholly out of relation with that intellect. All
problems involved in the study of mental and mate-
rial processes, on the contrary, are strictly legitimate,
and such problems are undoubtedly solvable. In these
regions of investigation there may be a vast unknown,
but there is no "unknowable." *
Dr. Carus tells us that "unknowability is not a
quality inherent in things." To afBrm the contrary
would be to posit an absurdity—of which neither Mr.
Spencer nor any of his intelligent expositors are
guilty. Manifestly, the ability or non-ability to know
is a quality of minds, not of things. It is the limita-
tion of mental capacity which renders Reality, in its
essential constitution, unknowable, not the nature of
that immanent constitution-. Things or processes are
knowable under the conditions b}' which they are re-
latable to the psychic nature, and are thus capable of
responding to its prescient interrogations. In so far as
they are not so related, they are, to the possessors of
finite psychical natures, unknowable.
If, therefore, as Dr. Carus assures us, "Reality is.
It is undivided and indivisible. And parts of reality
[only] are symbolised in words " ("Fundamental Prob-
lems," p. 300), will he not kindly define for us the in-
trinsic nature of this Reality as a whole ? The editor
of The Open Court is an acute thinker, and a master
of clear and intelligible forms of expression. He has
lucidly defined the nature of mental and material pro-
cesses. If, as he has repeatedly asserted, the incom-
prehensible is the non-existent, will he not render
comprehensible, in clear and definite terms of the
known, the nature of the one reality? Without such
a clear definition which shall at once explain Reality,
and differentiate it from those verbal and symbolical
abstractions known as "mind," "matter," "force,"
"motion," etc., the word "reality" is no more intel-
ligible as a designation than is the word "unknow-
able." It is equally a term used to veil or expound
our ignorance.
* It is strange that the critics of philosophical agnosticism should under-
stand the advocates of that doctrine to assert that Reality /tfr« is unknowable,
since to do so would constitute the complete negation of their own philosophy.
It would affirm a knowledge of the nature of Reality which their philosophy
expressly disclaims. Expressed syllogistically, the argument would proceed
as follows :
1. Finite minds cannot know the nature of Reality.
2. The human mind is finite.
3. Hence, the human mind kntyws that Reality per se is unknowablel
The third term is evidently a non seguitur
The philosophical agnostic cannot agree with the
objective monist that the incomprehensible is neces-
sarily the non-existent. If the "incomprehensibility"
were in the nature of Reality, then indeed this might
not be an unreasonable assumption, though a dog-
matic assumption it would be in any case, not a de-
monstrable fact. But since that which renders Real-
ity incomprehensible is the finite and arbitrary limita-
tions of man's psj'chic nature, the determination of the
truth that Being or Reality, in its essential constitu-
tion, is unknowable, is a simple logical deduction from
the proven facts of psychological science. There is no
"mystery" or "metaphysics" or "supernaturalism "
involved in it whatever.
Dr. Carus informs us dogmatically that "A tran-
scendent existence that exists by itself without exhib-
iting any effects is no existence. It is an impossibility.
Existence without effects is a mere phrase without any
meaning, not realisable in thought." Inasmuch as no
one— at least, no Spencerian agnostic—assumes an
existence " that exists by itself without exhibiting any
effects," we may pass by the dogmatic character of
the statement. AH that appears in consciousness is
the effect of the immanent presence and potency of
real existence. It is admitted that Reality, to beings
possessed of psychic self-consciousness, always ex-
hibits effects which are symbolically reflected therein.
It is claimed, however, that these effects are not com-
petent to reveal to the consciousness of finite beings
the intrinsic nature of Reality.
Nor can the philosophical agnostic admit that "ab-
solute existence is impossible. " Science assures him
that the material world was evolved long before any
individualised form of consciousness had an existence.
Being could then have had no "manifestation,"* un-
less we conceive of the Universe itself as possessing a
psychic self-consciousness. To assert that Reality can
have no existence apart from manifestation in anj'
other sense is pure idealism.
Neither Mr. Spencer nor any other advocate of
philosophical agnosticism asserts that Reality is un-
knowable per se, or in any other sense than the one
heretofore indicated. On the contrary, that it is known
as existing, as the immanent source, life and nexus of
all those disparate symbolical abstractions which are
included in mental and material processes, is affirmed
as knowledge of the highest assured verity—fundamen-
tal to all our other knowledge. Should man develop
* (This is a misconception of my position. Manifestation has been ex-
plained in Fundamental Problems as '* the effectiveness of things in their rela-
tions." The term manifestation is often, perhaps mostly, used in the sense of
becoming manifest to some sentient or thinking being. At the time when I
used the expression, I gave the following explanation in No. 121 of The Open
Court, Dec. 19th 1S89 : " Existence is real by manifesting itself somehow. It
need not manifest itself to me, A pebble on the surface of the moon which per-
haps no living creature has ever seen, manifests its existence by a pressure
upon the moon, a reflection of sunbeams, and in innumerable other ways."
—
Editor.]
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more and acuter faculties of sense-perception, new and
finer modes of psychical abstraction and synthesis,
this Reality would be related to him in ways of which
he can now form no conception. The term " matter"
might, in such a not inconceivable event, cease to
adequately represent his symbolical interpretation of
its objective relations to his consciousness.
Not, however, until he shall cease utterly to be a
finite being, not until all limitations to his modes of
sense-perception shall be wholly abrogated, not until
he shall become in fact omnipresent and omniscient,
can he ever know the ultimate Reality through and
through, in its full essential constitution. He cannot
know it otherwise than relatively, by means of ab-
stractions and thought-symbols determined by his own
psychical nature, and responding to its finite limita-
tions. The unknowability of Reality in its immanent
constitution is a logical and inexpugnable corollary
from the admitted truth that the psychical nature of
man is finite and limited.
AGNOSTICISM IN "THE MONIST "
BY ELLIS THURTELL.
The pages of the first volume of The Monist con-
tain several criticisms of Agnosticism, as understood
by Dr. Paul Carus, that are of great interest and im-
portance. Dr. Carus seems bent on demonstrating
that however anxious any Agnostic may be to take
rank among the Positive Monists, he can by no means
consistently do so without forfeiting his right to the
title of Agnostic. Well, I for one should be very sorry
to think that this conclusion is the inevitable result of
really clear cogitation on the matter. And when so
competent a reasoner as Dr. Carus assures us that it
is—despite my own conviction to the contrary— I am
glad to harbor the hope that our difference of opinion
may after all arise rather from explainable distinctions
of definition than from inherent incompatibility of
ideas.
To start with, in the first number of The Monist ^nq
are told : "The negative features of Descartes's phi-
" losophy naturally found their ultimate completion
"in Agnosticism. The assumption of the existence
"of a subject led to the doctrine that this subject is
" unknowable." Now I am in entire agreement with Dr.
" Carus—following Kant—in holding that " Descartes's
"famous syllogism Cogito ergo sum" must be held to
contain a fallacy, so far as it is supposed to prove the
positive existence of a subject apart from thought and
feeling. Indeed that the state of consciousness ex-
pressed by the verb Cogito does not necessarily imply
anything underlying itself ; still less that this under-
lying something is unknowable.
Again we read: "The assumption of something
"that underlies the acts of thought leads to the assump-
'
' tion of somethmg that underlies objective existence.
"
But neither do I pin my philosophic faith to any such
underlying something. The walnut table at which I
write is, I am convinced, that very sort of object which
it seems to my subjective self to be. For I wholly ac-
cept the dictum of Dr. Carus that "The data of
knowledge are not mere subjective states, they are re-
lations between subject and object." And am cer-
tainly of opinion that whatever different impressions
the table may produce upon different people are due
not to any unknowability of its actual nature, but sim-
ply to the differences observed to exist between the
brain and senses of one person and another—the sub-
jective factor, namely, that forms one, and one only
essential half in every act of knowledge. "Objectiv-
" ity," indeed, as Dr. Carus says, "is no chimaera ;
" and we are very well enabled to establish the truth or
" untruth of objective facts." Nor can I see anything
in my Agnosticism to prohibit my believing that
"the philosophy of the future accordingly will be a
"philosophy of facts; it will he positivism : and in so
"far as a unitary systematisation of facts is the aim
"and ideal of all science it will be Monism." The
prince of Agnostics, Herbert Spencer himself has
spoken of the "tacit implication* [in his scheme] that
philosophy is completely unified knowledge"; and
that "unification is possible, and that the end of phi-
" losophy is the achievement of it."
Now this view of the function of philosophy—com-
mon as it evidently is to Herbert Spencer and to The
Moiiisfs editor—leads us on to what seems to me a
prime misconception of that Spencerian type of Ag-
nosticism by which, in the main, I hold. In the
fourth number of The Monist Dr. Carus gravely ob-
serves : " Agnosticism is in our opinion no sound basis
"upon which to erect ethics." Nor is it in ours, nor
in that of any one else so far as we know. Why in-
deed should Agnosticism be brought into the question
at all? "Mr. Herbert Spencer who for some reason
"or other tried to escape the consequences of his Ag-
" nosticism in the ethical field," would, I fancy, be
very much surprised to hear of this suggested effort.
Dr. Pfleiderer—in his "Development of Theology,"
recently written for an English Library of Philosoph}'
—well remarks: "The Agnosticism which Spencer
"adopted from Hamilton and Mansel forms but the
" one aspect of his philosophy ; to a certain extent the
"convenient background into which all metaphysical
"problems can be relegated, so as to construct with
"fewer hindrances a system of natural evolution from
" the results of modern science." He goes on to point
out that the idea of Evolution is the mainspring of the
whole matter which Herbert Spencer has to impart.
And that "he has placed the doctrine of the incogni-
* " First Principles," 5th Edition, p. 539.
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"sability of the Absolute as a wall of separation be-
"tween philosophy and religion that an eternal peace
"may be concluded between them."
For Herbert Spencer holds, as Dr. Pfleiderer ob-
serves "that in every one of the three main [cos-
" mic] theories—Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism— is
"shown the impossibility of a satisfactory solution
" that is not self-contradictory. It follows that God,
"the Absolute, the Unconditioned is not for us cog-
"nisable. " So far, in point of fact, and no farther
does Herbert Spencer's Agnosticism extend.- It has
relation only to the three prevailing theories of ulti-
mate Causation : and it simply and solely consists in
the passing of a verdict of " non-proven " against each
and all of these. Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism
are formally declared out of court as altogether too
dogmatic. And the conclusion come to is, that about
their several theses nothing can be positively known.
To this conclusion—however arrived at—Professor
Huxley has happily enough given the name of Agnos-
ticism. And though the word is not mentioned in the
" First Principles," Herbert Spencer has in his " Ec-
clesiastical Institutions," definitely adopted it as de-
scriptive of his creed. He may indeed consider, as
Dr. Pfleiderer believes him to do, that the unknowa-
bility he posits is not merely relative but absolute.
Here many of us would probably not follow him,
deeming ourselves to be deciding more in accordance
with the evidence by declaring that we do not know
how that may be. Herbert Spencer, however, has an-
ticipated some such objection to any assertion of an
unknown that is also absolutely unknowable. In the
last page of his " Ecclesiastical Institutions " he speaks
of "that analysis of knowledge which while forcing
'
' him [the Spencerian] to Agnosticism, yet continually
"prompts him to imagine some solution of the great
"enigma which he knows cannot be solved." The
only satisfactory answer to any Agnosticism, whether
absolute or relative, surely must be to show that there
is some actual solution of the great enigma. And
this, upon any other than already discredited super-
naturalistic grounds, has never yet been done. Until
it is done I for one must take leave to declare my-
self an Agnostic while claiming at the same time,
and without any sense of self-contradiction, to be con-
sidered a Positive Monist- -by belief and tendency, if
not b}' any assertion of certainty or completed knowl-
edge.
Prof. J. R. Seeley, in his "Natural Religion," has
remarked that the most embittered war of words is
usually that which is carried on between those whose
differences consist only in words. Let us hope that
the conflict between Spencerian Agnosticism and
Open Court Monism is not destined to illustrate the
truth of this observation. I say Spencerian .^gnosti-
cism advisedly. For there is a type of Agnosticism
—
not altogether unfamiliar I believe to Dr. Carus
which certainly tends to be gnostic where Herbert
Spencer is agnostic, and agnostic (through want of
perfect sympathy with sound science) where Spencer
and all strong psychologists are gnostic. It is not the
Agnosticism in fine of every rhetorical writer upon my
own side that I feel called upon to defend. But that
Agnosticism only which, following (with the slightest
modifications suggested by individual thought) the
profoundly philosophic lead of Herbert Spencer, owes
its existence simply to the scientific principle of judg-
ment suspended until sufficient evidence appears. In
this light the absolutely unknowable, which has hith-
erto been the great bugbear barrier between modified
Spencerian Agnosticism and the Positive Monism of
The Open Court, is transmuted into the merely actual
unknown. That the recognition of this relative and
subjective Unknowability on the part of Agnostics
could ever have been a line of separation can be be-
lieved by no one at all familiar with the writings of
Dr. Carus. And that all definite Agnosticism has
seemed to him so essentially antagonistic to his own
philosophic faith must arise from something of misrepre-
sentation on one side and misconception on the other.
Surely the time has come for this unnecessary and
unfortunate misunderstanding to be removed.
SPENCERIAN AGNOSTICISM.
I. IN REPLY TO MR. ELLIS THURTELL.
Mr. Herbert Spencer as a philosopher and as a
thinker is a power in our age, not only because he un-
derstands how to deal with deep problems so as to
impress his conception of them upon the reader, but
also because his views strongly coincide with the Zeit-
geist of the present generation. I am fully aware of
the fact that on many most important subjects the
tenets of The Monist and The Open Court are in per-
fect sympathy with the spirit of Mr. Spencer's philos-
ophy, but at the same time I recognise that there are
points not less important in which there is no agree-
ment, and perhaps the most important one is the doc-
trine of agnosticism.
We should be very glad to learn that Mr. Spencer's
agnosticism was such as Mr. Ellis Thurtell represents
it. In the light in which he views the subject, "the
absolutely unknowable which has hitherto been the
great bugbear barrier between modified Spencerian
agnosticism and the Positive Monism of The Open
Court, is transmuted into the merely actually un-
known." I am fully in sympathy with this " modified
Spencerian agnosticism," and I wish that Mr. Spencer
had consented to the modification himself. If Mr.
Thurtell's conception of Spencerianism is different from
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mine, it may arise, as Mr. Thurtell suggests, from a
misconception on my part, but I doubt it. The ques-
tion however is easily decided by looking up Mr. Spen-
cer's First Principles. Let him declare in his own
words whether his idea of the unknowable is merely
relative and not absolute, whether it consists simply
and solely of a verdict of "not proven" with regard
to the several theses of Atheism, Pantheism, and
Theism.*
The first chapter of the First Principles (p. 46)
ends with the following sentences :
"And thus the mystery which all religions recognise, turns
out to be a far more transcendent mystery than any of them sus-
pect—not a relative, but an absolute mystery
.\
" Here, then, is an ultimate religious truth of the highest pos-
sible certainty!!]—a truth in which religions in general are at one
with each other, and with a philosophy antagonistic to their special
dogmas. And this truth, respecting which there is a latent agree-
ment among all mankind from the fetish-worshipper to the most
stoical critic of human creeds, must be the one we seek. If Re-
ligion and Science are to be reconciled, the basis of reconciliation
must be this deepest, widest, and most certain [!] of all facts—that
the Power of which the Universe manifests to us is idterly inscrut-
able.^^ \
This passage, it seems to me, is sufficient to dis-
prove Mr. Thurtell's allegation that I had misconstrued
Mr. Spencer's position. Mr. Spencer's unknowable
is not merely an unknown, it is a "transcendent mys-
tery" and "utterly inscrutable." And this idea I deem
indeed to be "essentially antagonistic to the faith
of Monistic Positivism."
The importance which Mr. Spencer attributes to
the Unknowable in his theoretical world-conception
ought to give it a prominent place also in his ethics,
for ethics is nothing but the practical application of a
theory. Mr. Spender's philosophy is not a unitary
and consistent system, but an amalgamation of several
incompatible systems. A consistent ethigs of agnosti-
cism would be mysticism, i. e., a theory which holds
that we feel impelled to do our duty without being able
to explain the nature of duty ; what conscience, justice,
morality, etc., really are can never be known. A con-
sistent ethics of the philosophy of evolution would be
evolutionism, i. e. the proposition "good is that which
enhances the process of evolution, bad is that which
hinders it or prepares a dissolution." Mr. Spencer
neglects his theories, agnosticism as well as evolution-
ism, entirely In his ethics, and I cannot help consider-
ing this as an inconsistency on Mr. Spencer's part. J
* By the bye, we do not believe that the propositions of atheism, theism,
and pantheism lie outside the pale of science. The problems of the existence
of God, the personality of God, etc., are not subjects concerning which we can
never come to a detinite conclusion. Indeed they are no longer open questions
to him who has taken the trouble to infoim himself about the present state of
investigation.
t Italics are ours.
X Mr. Spencer's philosophy is lacking in more than one respect in con-
sistency. This is a truth unknown only to his blind followers, which will ap-
pear as soon as anyone attempts to condense his views, Ueberweg, for in-
Of "the great enigma which the Spencerian knows
cannot be solved," Mr. Thurtell says "there is an ac-
tual solution." It has not as yet been found ; until it
is found, he says, he for one must take leave to de-
clare himself an agnostic. This agnosticism which
recognises our own ignorance, the agnosticism of mod-
esty as I called it in some previous articles, is a most
recommendable attitude, which will help us to do away
with our ignorance. I am far from having objections
to the agnosticism of modesty because, on innumerable
subjects, I shall have to take rank myself among this
class of agnostics. We have no quarrel with the ag-
nosticism which is simply "the scientific principle of
judgment suspended until sufficient evidence appears."
This settles the point at issue between Mr. Thurtell
and myself. Yet I feel urged to add a few comments
concerning Mr. Spencer's philosophy.
II. THE RECONCILIATION OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE ON
THE BASIS OF THE UNKNOWABLE.
Mr. Spencer's reconciliation of Religion and Science
on the basis of the Unknowable appears to us very un-
satisfactory ; and it will be seen to be impracticable,
because it rests upon erroneous premises. It is not
true that on the one side religion is based upon the
unknown or unknowable, and on the other side that
the ultimate ideas of science are inscrutable and repre-
sentative of realities that cannot be comprehended.
Religion is everywhere based upon the known and
knowable. The savage worships the thunderstorm
not because it is something inscrutable to him, but
because he is afraid of it ; he actually knows that it can
do him harm. The obvious danger connected with a
phenomenon makes man anxious to adapt his conduct
to it, so that he will escape unscathed. If a phenom-
enon is not sufficiently known in its causes, this will
breed erroneous conceptions or superstitions, and
there is no conciliation possible between the latter and
science. It is true that the facts of nature which have
made man religious were misunderstood by the savage
and most facts are still little understood by the scien-
stance, says in his History of PItilosophy [Translated from the 4th German edi-
tion by Geo. S. Morris, p. 432) in a synopsis of Mr. Spencer's views about
matter and mind, which are declared to be unknowable in First Principles ;
"As to what matter and mind are, he [Mr. Spencer] replies sometimes
" that we can know it, because a being is required to manifest phenomena,
" sometimes because persistence in consciousness supposes correspondence in
"permanent forces, sometimes because the two conceptions are the same,
" sometimes that matter and mind are simply bundles or series of phenomena
" and nothing besides. Sometimes he reasons as though causality were a di-
"rect and self-evident relation, and sometimes as though this relation were
" nothing more than an order of sensations and our belief in it were the growth
" of inseparable associations."
Ueberweg sums up liis review of Mr. Spencer in the following paragraph:
"The system of Spencer is still under criticism, and perhaps may not
" have been fully expounded by its author. Possibly it has not yet been com-
"pletely developed. Should Spencer continue to devote to philosophy his
" active energies for many years, it is not inconceivable that new associations
" may take possession of that physiological organisation which he is accus-
" tomed to call himself, and perhaps be evolved under another system of tirst
"principles which may displace those which he taught hitherto."
THE OPEN COURT. 2953
tists to-day. But it is not this lack of comprehension
upon which religion was then and is now based ; on
the contrary, religion is based upon the more or less
clearly conceived idea that we have to conform to a
power not ourselves. The conciliation of religion with
science, as we understand it, can be brought about only
by a purification of our conception of the power to
which we have to conform. That religion will be the
purest and highest which holds forth the simple state-
ment of provable truth as the basis of ethics ; and this
religion cannot be in conflict with science, for it is to
be based upon that which we know, and not upon that
which we do not know. If a religion, based upon that
which we do not know, be found to be reconcilable
with science, it will be mere hap-hazard, a matter
of pure chance, and at any rate the principle of such
a religion will under all circumstances be antagonistic
to science.
On the one hand religion is not based upon the un-
known, and on the other hand, the ultimate scientific
ideas are not incomprehensible. How does Mr. Spencer
arrive at the strange view that these ideas are repre-
sentative of realities that cannot be comprehended ?
He proposes a number of conceptions of the terms
space, time, matter, and motion, which are unten-
able and self- contradictory and then concludes that
they "pass all understanding." Mr. Spencer however
overlooks in all these conceptions that they are mere
abstractions describing certain qualities, that these
terms represent these qualities, and comprehension is
nothing more or less than a proper and systematic
representation. We know what matter, motion, space
and time are, if considered as abstractions, although
it is true we cannot know what they are in themselves.
But we need not know it, for space, time, matter, and
motion do not exist in themselves ; they are not things
in themselves ; they are simply abstracts representing
certain qualities of reality.
Let us take the term motion as an example. Mr.
Spencer says :
'•' Here, for instance, is a ship which, for simplicity's sake, we
will suppose to be anchored at the equator with her head to the
West. When the captain walks from stem to stern, in what direc-
tion does he move ? East is the obvious answer—an answer which
for the moment may pass without criticism. But now the anchor
is heaved, and the vessel sails to the West with a velocity equal to
that at which the captain walks. In what direction does he now
move when he goes from stem to stern ? You cannot say East, for
the vessel is carrying him as fast towards the West as he walks to
the East ; and you cannot say West for the converse reason. In
respect to surrounding space he is stationary ; though to all on
board the ship he seems to be moving. Bat now are we quite sure
of this conclusion ?—Is he really stationary ? When we take into
account the Earth's motion round its axis, we find that instead of
being stationary he is travelling at the rate of 1000 miles per hour
to the East ; so that neither the perception of one who looks at
him, nor the inference of one who allows for the ship's motion, is
anything like the truth. Nor indeed, on further consideration.
shall we find this revised conclusion to be much better. For we
have forgotten to allow for the Earth's motion in its orbit. This
being some 68,000 miles per hour, it follows that, assuming the
time to be midday, he is moving, not at the rate of 1000 miles per
hour to the East, but at the rate of 67,000 miles per hour to the
West. Nay, not even now have we discovered the true rate and
the true direction of his movement. With the Earth's progress in
its orbit, we have to join that of the whole Solar system towards
the constellation Hercules ; and when we do this, we perceive that
he is moving neither East nor West, but in a line inclined to the
plane of the Ecliptic, and at a velocity greater or less (according
to the time of the year) than that above named. To which let us
add, that were the dynamic arrangements of our sidereal system
fully known to us, we should probably discover the direction and
rate of his actual movement to differ considerably even from these.
How illusive are our ideas of Motion, is thus made sufficiently
manifest. That which seems moving proves to be stationary ; that
which seems stationary proves to be moving ; while that which we
conclude to be going rapidly in one direction, turns out to be going
much more rapidly in the opposite direction. And so we are taught
that what we are conscious of is not the real motion of any object,
either in its rate or direction ; but merely its motion as measured
from an assigned position—either the position we ourselves occupy
or some other."
Motion is a change of place, but this change of
place is not something absolute. It is nothing in it-
self. It is relative and can be determined only by a
reference point. If we omit this reference point in
our description of a certain motion we shall find our-
selves unable to determine either its velocity or its di-
rection and in this way truly "our ideas of motion "
are "thus made illusive." To describe a relation
without considering it as a relation to something, is
impossible and nonsensical.
Let us take one more instance. Mr. Spencer says
that "all hypotheses respecting the constitution of
matter commit us to inconceivable conclusions when
logically developed." Now it is a trite truism that we
know little of the constitution of the elements and there
are innumerable problems of physics and chemistry
unsolved yet and our scientists have no hope to solve
all these problems within any reasonable time. If
this were Mr. Spencer's meaning, we need no agnos-
ticism to be told so, for the world has known that long
ago. Yet this is not Mr. Spencer's meaning. He de-
clares that "matter in its ultimate nature is as abso-
lutely incomprehensible as Space and Time." And
the efforts, which he makes with the foredetermined
aim that they should fail and end in contradictions are
upon the whole attempts to think of matter, force, mo-
tion, space, and time not as abstracts but as absolute
entities, as things in themselves. They become incon-
ceivable not by being logically but by being illogically
developed. He says for instance (p. 53):
"The idea of resistance cannot be separated in thought from
the idea of an extended body which offers resistance To suppose
that central forces can reside in points not infinitesimally small but
occupying no space whatever
—
points having position only, with
nothing to mark their position
—
points in no respect distinguish-
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able from the surrounding points that are not centres of force ;—
to suppose this, is utterly beyond human power."
If we suppose that centres of force existed as math-
ematical points separated itom extended bodies, we
forget that our ideas of force and of bodies and of ex-
tension are mere abstractions. To think of our ab-
stract ideas as if they were things in themselves, ab-
solute existences, will always and necessarily lead us
into contradictions.
Things in themselves do not exist, they are ghosts.
If we try to conceive the nature of ghosts, we shall
naturally turn agnostics, but if we bear in mind that
our ideas have been abstracted from reality, that they
are symbols describing certain parts or features of re-
ality, we shall soon learn to understand that these
ghosts do not exist.
It would lead us too far here to show that Mr.
Spencer's method of making every one of "the ulti-
mate scientific ideas " mysterious is throughout the
same. He tacitly neglects some of their fundamental
features and upon the whole treats them as if they
ought to be things in themselves. This method of
dealing with the problems of space, time, matter, and
motion will strongly appeal to mystic minds, but it
will not further our insight. The aim of philosophy
is not to confound our concepts, not to entangle our
minds in hopeless confusion, but to clarify our ideas
and render them precise so that we shall know what
they represent and how to employ them.
The actual fact is that a partial knowledge of cer-
tain natural phenomena is the basis of religious ac-
tion. Monists consider the positive element of knowl-
edge as the main thing, while Mr. Spencer on the
contrary eliminates the positive element of knowledge
and retains the negative element of ignorance, the
quintessence of which he calls "the Unknowable,"
—
oblivious of the fact that in reality there are no such
things as negative magnitudes. While Monism leads to
the formulation of a religion of Science, Mr. Spencer's
conception of religion is the acquiescence in the Un-
knowable. Our conception of God is the recognition
of that power to which we have to conform, and our
knowledge of it increases with the progress of science,
while Mr. Spencer's idea of God is the Unknowable.
It is just as erroneous for a philosopher to extract
that which we do not know as the quintessence of re-
ligious belief, as it would be for a chemist to extract
all those substances of a body which it does not con-
tain and to consider them as the real thing.
The negative magnitude of the not-yet known is,
as all mere possibilities must be, infinite. If this nega-
tive magnitude were indeed a positive existence and
the essential thing in religion, it would dwarf all pro-
gress into insignificance and would stamp upon all
our aspirations the curse of vanity.
Mr. Spencer's proposition of the Reconciliation of
Science with religion is the assurance that science will
leave always an unbounded territory for all kinds of
unwarranted assumptions and superstitions, while our
proposition implies the purification of religion from
erroneous notions. It is the proposition of a great
work to be accomplished.
III. THE WORLD-ENIGMA OF A FIRST CAUSE.
The simplest idea, if we misunderstand it, will be-
come a mystery. And is not perhaps also the great
world-enigma which can never be solved, a mistaken
proposition ?
Prof. W. K. Clifford in his lecture on "Theories
of Physical Forces" endeavors to explain the redun-
dancy of the question "why?" in science. Science
teaches that it is so and that it must be so. Given
one moment of the world-process, and we can calcu-
late the next following or any other one with certainty :
we can say that it must be such or such a state of
things. But the "why?" of things, he says, does not
lie in the range of science, for the question has no
sense. We should prefer to say, The tracing of the
"that "is the only legitimate conception of the "why?"
Clifford's proposition is directed against metaphys-
ical philosophers to whom there is a "why?" of facts,
that is to say, a reason for the world at large, or as it
is sometimes expressed "a First Cause." Clifford's
conception of the " why ?" and the "that," it appears
to us, is simply the denunciation of the so-called
great world-enigma as a sham problem which has no
sense. Knowledge means a representation of facts in
mental symbols and comprehension means a unifica-
tion or harmonious systematisation of these symbols.
At any rate we have to start with facts. As soon, how-
ever, as we attempt to start with nothing and hope by
some sleight of hand to create facts or to evolve them
out of non-existence, we are confronted with an in-
solvable world-problem. Yet the proposition of this
world-problem can bear no close investigation.. It
rests upon a misstatement of the case, for the very de-
mand to produce positive facts out of nothing, is itself
contradictory and is as absurd as the idea of a First or
Ultimate Cause.
The idea of a first cause rests upon a confusion of
the terms "cause" and " raison d'etre." A first cause
cannot exist, because every cause is the effect of a
former cause, but we may conceive of an ultimate
raison d'etre. Every raison d'etre of a natural process
is formulated in a natural law and all these natural
laws, if they were all known and investigated, would
form one great system of laws which can serve as a
means of orientation in this world. The most general
of these laws, being the most comprehensive statement
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of facts, would be the ultimate raison d' c/re or ground
of the world.
The idea of an ultimate ground or raison d'etre of
the world is legitimate but the idea of a " First Cause"
is spurious. A First Cause is inscrutable indeed, not
because it is so profound an idea that "it passes all
comprehension," but simply because it is a self-con-
tradictory and nonsensical idea.
IV. THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE.
My reply to Mr. Thurtell is to a great extent also a
reply to Dr. Lewis G. Janes. I am glad to see that
he also abandons the idea of an absolutely unknowable,
of something that is unknowable per se, but I find him
still entangled in a strange misconception of the na-
ture of knowledge. He maintains, that we cannot
know the innermost, the intrinsic, the essential nature
of reality and challenges me to define it. I must con-
fess that I do not know what Dr. Janes means by in-
nermost, intrinsic, and essential nature of reality and if
he uses these words it is an unfair demand on his part
to ask me for an explanation.
Dr. Janes says, "the philosophical agnostic . . .
recognises . . . that reality can only be known indi-
rectly by and through the interpretation of thought-
symbols." This he says, after having stated my po-
sition as if it were essentially the same. It comes
very near our position 3'et it differs from it in two im-
portant points. We say, the representation of reality
in thought-symbols is knowledge. There is nothing
indirect about it, nor is there any further interpreta-
tion of the thought-symbols needed.
If we speak for instance of reality in general we
mean those features of reality which are common to
all real things. The term reality in so far as it is most
general is at the same time most empty ; it is bare of
contents, it is in its kind the most vague and the least
definite of concepts. The term iron is more definite
than the term metal. All the diverse qualities of iron
are so many features of the innermost nature of this
metal. The most general term "matter" is as a mat-
ter of course the least definite. It is a mistake based
upon a misconception of the functions of our thought-
symbols to expect that the most general terms shall
contain an explanation of the world-problem. The
term "reality" means nothing but actual being and
cannot give us any information about the innermost
nature of being. If we speak of reality as a whole, we
cannot at the same time speak of the particular qual-
ities of reality, because these particular qualities have
been purposely excluded, and I see no use in forming
a concept which shall at the same time be most gen-
eral and indefinite and yet reveal all the definite de-
tails, thus defining at once the innermost, essential,
and intrinsic nature of reality as a whole.
Knowledge is a description of facts, but not an in-
terpretation of the description. Certain facts are de-
picted in mental symbols, they stand for and repre-
sent these facts. The simplest of these mental sym-
bols are sense-impressions of certain forms, called sen-
sations. Through a comparison of sensations and with
the help of abstraction other mental symbols of a
higher degree are formed which represent realities in
terms of form, so that the things or processes can be
represented with objective exactness in definite num-
bers by measuring and counting. But even these sym-
bols, the abstract concepts of science, remain a simple
description of facts. It is not clear to my mind why
knowledge is to be called indirect or an interpretation
of thought-symbols. It appears to me that only through
these additional elements attached to the concept
knowledge can we be led to the belief in an unknow-
able. Dr. Janes declares, that " the recognition of this
fact (viz., of symbolism constituting the very nature of
our knowledge) is the irrefragable foundation of philo-
sophical agnosticism.
Cognition is possible only through limitation. We
confine our attention to one particular feature, and form
a mental abstract to represent it. All our senses are
organs of limitation ; every sense represents one kind
of effect of reality upon our sensibility. To demand a
knowledge which is independent of the conditions of
knowledge, is to demand something which is impos-
sible. Man is a finite being. Certainly ! And the nature
of his knowledge is always finite and limited. But
knowledge is possible wherever a sentient being faces
reality and is affected by reality. To be omnipresent
is most certainly impossible to a limited being. Ex-
actly so and not otherwise is it impossible to be om-
niscient, that is, to know also all the details of those
parts of reality with which we do not come in actual
contact. But this truth does not imply, as Dr. Janes
declares that it does, " the Unknowability of Reality
in its immanent constitution."
Reality per se means Reality in itself, and reality
in itself means the nature of reality, or reality consid-
ered objectively. Dr. Janes says: " Finite minds can-
not know the nature of Reality." Since all minds are
finite, infinite minds being as impossible as immaterial
matter, this means : " Reality per se is unknow;ible."
The gist of the footnote on p. 2949 seems to be, "Re-
ality is so utterly unknowable that the human mind
cannot even know that it is unknowable." What a
bottomless abyss ! If that were so, man would have to
cease thinking.
v. THE UNKNOWABLE, THE IDEA OF AN INDEPENDENT
EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL, AND SPOOKISM.
That mind and motion are not convertible terms, is
an old idea which so far as we know was set forth
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for the first time with philosophical precision by Spi-
noza. It has been maintained by Locke and by Leib-
nitz and is the main foundation of modern psychology
since Weber and Fechner, represented at present by
Wundt in Germany and Ribot in France. It found
among the English psychologists a staunch defender
in George Henry Lewes. But it was strangely ne-
glected by Mr. Herbert Spencer. Professor Fiske suc-
ceeded in converting Mr. Spencer on this subject and
this change of opinion alone, it appears to me, would
necessitate Mr. Spencer's recasting his entire psychol-
ogy.* It now needs Dr. Janes to convert Mr. Spencer
to the idea that agnosticism does not involve any
"mystery," and we should be highly pleased if he
succeeded as well as Professor Fiske.
Mr. Wakeman has with reference to the unknow-
able spoken about spookism and mysticism, and Dr.
Janes calls him a spook-raiser.
Dr. Janes adds concerning agnosticism :
"There is no ' mystery ' or ' metaphysics ' or 'supernatural-
ism ' involved in it whatever."
This does not agree with Mr. Spencer's own words,
who speaks not only of mystery but actually abounds
in such expressions as transcendent mystery, absolute
mystery, utterly inscrutable, incomprehensible, un-
knowable realities.
The principle of economy is most recommendable
everywhere, in practical life, in science, and also in
matters of style. Would it not be quite an improve-
ment in Mr. Spencer's writings if he dropped through-
out the term "Unknowable" confining himself only to
state that which is known. Take for instance the pas-
sage quoted and objected to by Professor Fiske.
The same, unencum-
bered with "the Unknow-
able":
Motion, heat, light, chem-
ical, affinity, etc., are alike
transformable into each other
and into sensation, emotion,
thought, f
Mr. Spencer says :
Those modes of the Unknow-
able which we call motion, heat,
light, chemical, affinity, etc.,
are alike transformable into each
other, and into those modes of
the Unknowable which we dis-
tinguish as sensation, emotion,
thought.
Would not this simplify Mr. Spencer's ideas and
render his positive propositions more concise?
Agnosticism has not freed the world from the ghosts
of metaphysicism, and cannot conquer supernatural-
ism, although it has confessedly nothing to do with
them : it lets them alone. They live a safe life in
the realm of the unknowable. Mr. Wakeman, it ap-
pears, is very impetuous in his nature, and granting
his zeal in persecuting the ghosts of by-gone ages to
* To replace the phrase " nervous shock " by " psychical shock " as Prof.
Fiske proposes, will not do, tor according to Prof. Fiske himself the psychical
is outside the circuit of motions, and shocks are to be counted as mechanical.
"A psychical shock " would be a contradictio iti adjecto.
t Concerning my exposition that sensation and thought are not and cannot
be transformed motion, Dr. Janes says (p. 21)48) that it " admirably expresses
the idea of Mr. Spencer." Why does Mr. Spencer then say just the opposite ?
be exaggerated, granted that the ghosts of agnosticism
are tame in comparison with the ghosts of the old times
of witchcraft, I see, nevertheless, that there is after
all some reason for his speaking of spookism. Pro-
fessor Fiske who is so clear concerning the non-inter-
convertibility of matter and motion, drops at once into
the very same confusion against which he has guarded
himself and others, as soon as he discusses " tran-
scendental subjects. " He says :
" That the Infinite Eternal Power that animates the universe
must be psychical in its nature, that any attempt to reduce it to
mechanical force must end in absurdity, and that the only kind of
monism which will stand the test of an ultimate analysis is mono-
theism."
Here is a confusion of ideas. If there is an In-
finite and Eternal Power at all, it must be convertible
into mechanical force. If a power cannot be reduced
to mechanical force, we should not call it power ; and
if God, the Infinite Something, the Infinite Unknow-
able, is not at the same time mechanical force but
purely psychical in his nature, how can he produce
the world of motion—supposing that there is no cor-
relation (as Professor Fiske maintains) between the
psychical and motion.* I do not intend to discuss
the subject here, it is sufficient to point out that Pro-
fessor Fiske's view of the psychical and of God is still
different from the positive world-conception of Monism,
and Professor Fiske's view cannot be said to be free
from what in my mind appears as fantastic notions.
The expression that "the psychical activities do
not enter into the circuit, but stand outside of it, as a
segment of a circle may stand outside of a portion of
an entire circumference with which it is concentric "
admits of a transcendental explanation, as if the psy-
chical could exist independent of the circuit of mo-
tions. And there are passages in Professor Fiske's
works which corroborate Mr. Wakeman's idea that he
believes in a transcendent psychical existence, a spirit
which is not motion, a soul-being which has nothing
to do with mechanical force. The psychical, in our
opinion, is an abstract idea just as much as motion;
it represents a certain quality of real things. And
the idea of some purely psychical being, be it finite or
infinite, is in our opinion a thing in itself, a chimera,
a ghost. Indeed, that is the kind of ghost in the most
limited and proper sense of the word. We shall be
glad to learn that this is not Professor Fiske's view of
the subject, but we must confess that his words
strongly suggest this interpretation of his philosophy.
Professor Fiske says in his "Cosmic Philosophy"
(ii, p. 445):
" But while the materialistic hypothesis is thus irretrievably
doomed, it is otherwise with the opposing spiritualistic hypothesis."
* Force is mass multiplied by acceleration, and power is the ability to do
work. Work is force acting through a distance. Both concepts serve special
purposes in mechanics. Prof. Fiske apparently uses the word either in a pop-
ular or a metaphysical sense where it may mean anything.
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And in "A Crumb for the 'Modern Sj-mposium,'
"
he says :
"It [science] does not entitle us to deny that soul may have
some such independent existence."
Professor Fiske does not deny his theological bias
and transcendental tendencies. He says :
"As regards the theological implications of the doctrine of
evolution, I have never undertaken to speak for Mr. Spencer ; on
such transcendental subjects it is quite enough if one speaks for
oneself. ... I do not pretend that my opinion in these matters is
susceptible of scientific demonstration."
Professor Fiske's view is at least not incompatible
with Mr. Spencer's view. Mr. Spencer's philosophy
is not monotheism, but the possibility of monotheism
is not excluded. He says in his First Principles (p.
108):
"Some do indeed allege that though the Ultimate Cause of
things cannot really be thought of by us as having specified attri-
butes, it is yet incumbent upon us to assert these attributes.
Though the forms of our consciousness are such that the .\bsolute
cannot in any manner or degree be brought within them, we are
nevertheless told that we must represent the Absolute to ourselves
under these forms. As writes Mr. Mansel, in the work from which
I have already quoted largely— 'It is our duty, then, to think of
God as personal ; and it is our duty to believe that He is infinite.'
"That this is not the conclusion here adopted, needs hardly
be said. If there be any meaning in the foregoing arguments,
duty requires us neither to affirm nor deny personality."
The doctrine that nothing can be known about
these so-called transcendental subjects, that " duty re-
quires us neither to affirm nor to deny " is perhaps not
spookism itself, but is the soil on which any kind of
spookism can prosper. Agnosticism gives to the ghosts
of metaphysics and theology the right patent to exist.
We do not wish to wage a war of words and should
be very glad if we could come to an understanding
with Mr. Spencer and the Spencerian agnostics. But
this understanding, so far as I can see, can only be
arrived at by agnosticism dropping some of those fea-
tures which Mr. Spencer himself has made most prom-
inent—especiallj' the idea of the unknowable as being
an absolute mystery and utterly inscrutable. And this
idea it appears to me is based on a vague notion that
knowledge is something more than a mere description
of facts in mental signs. p. c.
PROFESSOR HAECKEL'S MONISM AND THE IDEAS
GOD AND IMMORTALITY.
Four Letters : prof, ernst haeckel to mr. t. b.
wakeman. prof. ernst haeckel to mr. j. a. skil-
ton. dr. paul carus to prof. ernst haeckel.
prof. ernst haeckel to dr. paul carus.*
Mr. Th. B. U'akeman, 93 Nassau St., New York City.
My Dear Mr. Wakeman : My heartiest thanks for your s/'/eii-
did essay on my studies and also for the sympathy you extend to
me.
* Translated from the German.
Enclosed please find some theses for the session of the Brook-
lyn Ethical Association in answer to the request of Mr. Skilton.
With kind regards
Yours truly,
Ernst Haeckel.
The enclosure reads as follows ;
Mr. J. A. Sti/loii. Cor. Sec. of The Brooklyn Ethical Association.
Dear Sir : I thank you and Mr. Wakeman cordially for hav-
ing kindly sent me the essay of the latter concerning my works. I
am glad to see that the Brooklyn Ethical Association takes so lively
an interest in the progress of Monism and Transformism in Ger-
many. You wish me to send you some theses for your discussion
on the doctrine of evolution its scope and influence, which is pro-
posed to take place on May 31st. I have expressed my views on this
subject at length in the last (the eighth) edition of my "Natural
History of Creation." However the following points as funda-
mental theses, may perhaps be worthy of special emphasis :
1. The general doctrine of evolution appears to be already
unassailably established.
2. Thereby every supernatural creation is completely ex-
cluded.
3. Transformism and The Theory of Descent are inseparable
constituents of the Doctrine of Evolution.
4. The necessary conclusion of this proposition is the descent
of man from a series of vertebrates (Anthropogeny).
5. The belief in "an immortal Soul" and in "a personal
God " are therewith completely incompatible (I'd/lig itn-
vereinbar). Very respectfully yours,
Ernst Haeckel.
Prof. Ernst Haeckel, Jena.
My Dear Professor : I just received from Mr. T. B. Wake-
man, of New York, your letter and theses. He requests me to
publish the letter and I am willing to do so with your permission,
but I should like to have a few words of explanation from you.
- The fifth thesis discards the immortality of the soul and the
idea of a personal God. You confess monism but you identify the
latter on the one hand with Goethe's and Spinoza's pantheism, on
the other hand with Lange's and Biichner's materialism. In my
opinion Goethe's pantheism is radically different from Biichner's
materialism
; I am ready to accept the former but I cannot adopt
the latter. Materialism as I understand the term attempts to ex-
plain everything from force and matter. Goethe would never
have considered sensations or thoughts as material things. By
monism I understand solely the unity of the universe. The soul
of man is a certain abstraction which exists in connection with his
body ; the body of man is another abstraction ; and matter is by no
means an exhaustive or all-comprehensive concept. According to
my conception of monism there can be no bodiless soul, but soul
for that reason is neither matter nor force but an abstraction sui
generis.
Like you I consider the personality of God as scientifically
untenable, yet the existence of God appears to me indubitable as
soon as we understand by it Nature, in so far as it is not a chaos
but one law-regulated whole, the cognition of which is the basis
of our ethical actions. The God-idea in this sense is the corner-
stone of what might be called natural religion, the religion of
morality, or the religion of science. I should have no objection if
anyone would call this conception of God atheistic theism. I am
used to calling it entheism.
If by personality of the soul is to be understood the supposed
unity of a mystical soul-being, I should deny it just as much as
the personality of God. The soul is not an ego which thinks and
feels, but the feeling itself and the thinking itself are the soul.
To discuss the immortality of an ego-entity is senseless because it
does not exist, but it is different with regard to the soul as being the
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thinking itself and feeling itself. The soul being that special form
in which we feel and think is transferable by heredity and educa-
tion. There is a transference of the soul beyond death in this sense,
and the conception of this immortality is not only a scientific truth
but also of an incalculable practical importance. There are no
individual souls or ego-entities. Each soul consists of a system of
ideas and sensations which have reference to the surrounding
world. The ideas of the soul are not the product of the activity
of the individual but of human society. Man becomes man through
the humanity which lives in him, the soul in this sense is a spir-
itual treasure which is transmitted from generation to generation
and continues to live. The immortality of the soul, that is, the
immanent immortality is the condition of evolution.
When our ancestors spoke of the immortality of the soul,
they obeyed the natural impulse of self-conservation. The hope
of this self-conservation is no delusion if it is but rightly under-
stood. Certainly an ego-entity as which the soul was considered in
former times cannot be preserved and we need not mind that.
The grandeur and the beauty of a human soul, that is, the human-
ity in man, that which in reality the soul is, cognition of truth, to-
gether with human ideals are preserved even beyond the death of
the individual, and they will be preserved so long as the condi-
tions of the existence of humanity remain upon. earth.
These ideas are neither purely speculative nor are they fan-
tastical. The spiritual life of man, the evolution of ethical ideals
included, are just as well an object of exact science as are the
physical and the natural of human nature. In considering the
phenomena of the spiritual domain of life we must be just as care-
ful in our terms as in physiology or in any other branch of the
natural sciences. I know that you in spite of all the concentra-
tion with which you devote yourself to specialties have preserved a
warm interest for philosophical and ethical questions, and you have
pronounced your sympathy with the world-conception represented
in 77/1.' Open Court : therefore I wish you would give to your theses
an interpretation that cannot be misunderstood. A few words of ex-
planation concerning the points mentioned will be welcome.
In the hope that it shall again be permitted me to meet you
personally. I remain with kind regards.
Yours respectfully,
Paul Carus.
Dr. Paul Citrus,
My Dear Sir : Long ere this it would have been my duty
to write to you. First to thank you for sending me your highly
interesting work "The Soul of Man," and secondly to answer the
objections which you make in your letter of June loth against
several features of my monistic conception. However, I have had
eight months of trial and labor behind me, first through the long
and dangerous sickness of my wife who is now well again, and then
through the revision of my " Anthropogeny," which will presently
be completed. A tremendous amount of work ! Having ceased
work for twelve years in this province I had to read hundreds of
essays, to recast thousands of sentences or to replace them by
others. I can only complete such a great and difficult task by
doing it at one stroke in a relatively short time to the neglect of
everything else, and I hope that the book in its revised form will
be more valuable than before. Many of your questions are an-
swered in it.
It seems to me that your monistic world-conception agrees
with mine in all essential points. Apparent differences rest, as is
often the case in philosophy, upon misconceptions or upon a dif-
ference of definition. Your God andyour iiiniiortalily are also mine,
but the mass of mankind wants above all their personal ego im-
mortality, and everything else stands in second rank.
According to my conception, everything individual or personal
is a passing phenomenon of the world-evolution. All philosophical
systems are according to my conception—if worked out with con-
sistent logic—either monistic or dualistic as represented in the fol-
lowing table
:
Monism.
